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Abstract: The new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) has become central to monetary theory and policy. A 
seemingly benign NKPC prediction is that trend shocks dominate price level fluctuations at all forecast 
horizons. Since the NKPC cycle of the U.S. GDP deflator peaks at each of the last seven NBER dated 
recessions, support for the NKPC is limited. The authors develop monetary business cycle models that 
contain different combinations of nominal (sticky-price) and real (labor market search) rigidities to 
understand this puzzle. Simulations indicate that a model combining labor market search and flexible 
prices is better able to match actual price level movements than sticky-price models do. This model 
represents a challenge to claims that sticky prices are a key part of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. 
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common cycle 1. Introduction
Of all the comebacks of the 1990s, it seems a revivalin Phillips curve research was the least
anticipated. Unlike earlier Phillips curve research that focused on aggregate demand shocks, recent
work aims to identify inﬂationary expectations. The way inﬂationary expectations are formed mat-
ters for business cycle theory and monetary policy. For example, a Phillips curve dependent more
on forward- than backward-looking expectations allows policymakers to disinﬂate with few costs.
This favorable trade-off appears at odds with empirical evidence and the views of policymakers.
Yun(1996)constructsarationalexpectations-monetarybusinesscyclemodelconsistentwith
a revivalist Phillips curve. He assumes monopolistically competitive ﬁrms maximize their expected
discounted proﬁt stream subject to a sticky price constraint that reﬂects a nominal rigidity. The
solution to the ﬁrms’ problem can be cast as the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in which
price expectations are forward-lookingand real marginal cost is the fundamental.
The forward-looking NKPC implies a present-value (PV) relation for the price level. The
NKPC-PV relation predicts that trend shocks dominate price level movements, in the same way
the permanent income hypothesis restricts consumption. If the price level has an economically
important cycle, it rejects the NKPC null that only trend shocks matter.
This paper uses NKPC-PV predictions to ask if a sticky price-nominal rigidity is needed by
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to generate a NKPCthat mimics its empir-
ical counterpart. A Beveridge and Nelson (1981), Stock and Watson (1988), and Vahid and Engle
(1993) common trend-common cycle price level decomposition links the empirical and theoretical
NKPCs. Thus, we study a key feature of a Phillips curve: its predictions for price level dynamics.
1The Beveridge, Nelson, Stock, Watson-Vahid and Engle (BNSW-VE) decomposition of the
NKPC provides us with three “moments”. The moments are .i/ the fraction of price constrained
ﬁrms, .ii/ the NKPC common trend-common cycle decomposition, and .iii/ the associated fore-
cast error variance decomposition (FEVD). We use these moments to test the implications of the
NKPC-PV restrictions for DSGE models.1
Sample NKPC moments are based on U.S. GDP deﬂator and nominal unit labor cost data
thatruns from 1960Q1 to 2001Q4. Our estimateof NKPCmoment .i/ has about halfofﬁnalgoods
ﬁrms being price constrained, which is similar to Sbordone (2002), but smaller than those Gali and
Gertler (1999) report. The cycle of NKPC sample moment .ii/ is economically important because
it peaks at each of the last seven NBER dated recessions. NKPC sample moment .iii/ shows trend
shocks explain 60 percent of price level variation at a forecast horizon of two years. Thus, NKPC
sample moments .ii/ ￿ .iii/ reject the NKPC-PV predictions.
We solve and simulate a version of the Yun (1996) DSGE model to understand the sources
and causes of NKPC sample moments .i/￿.iii/. GivenYun’s results, it is no surprise the synthetic
NKPC of his Calvo (1983) staggered price-DSGE model is dominated by trend shocks. Although
this matches the NKPC-PV prediction, excess smoothness in the price level of the Yun-sticky price
model places this model at odds with NKPC sample moments .i/ ￿ .iii/.
Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten (2000) also cast doubt on sticky prices being a source of
aggregate ﬂuctuations. Ball and Romer (1990), Jeanne (1998), Gali and Gertler (1999), Dotsey
and King (2001), Walsh (2002), Trigari (2003b), and Ireland (2003) argue real rigidities solve this
1GreenwoodandHuffman(1986),Ch´ eronandLangot(1999), CooleyandQuadrini(1999),EllisonandScott(2000),
Walsh (2002), and Krause and Lubik (2003) use DSGE models to study unconditional Phillips curve observations.
2problem. For example, Ireland shows that a persistent, exogenous real demand shock is needed for
his sticky price model to match U.S. business cycle ﬂuctuations.2
Solow (1976) points out a traditional Phillips curve invokes the real rigidity of labor market
search, rather than sticky prices, to identify unemployment with the state of aggregate demand.
This idea motivate us to combine the Yun-sticky price model with Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
labor market search in the way Andolfatto(1996), Merz (1995), and den Haan, Ramey, and Watson
(2000) add it to real business cycle (RBC) models. Although Walsh (2002), Trigari (2003b), and
Krause and Lubik (2003) obtain economically interesting results with similar models, our labor
market search-sticky price model behaves about as well as the Yun-sticky price model in mimicking
NKPC sample moments .i/ ￿ .iii/. Besides difference in preferences and technologies, Walsh,
Trigari, and Krause and Lubik assume a representative household supported by complete insurance,
which we construct from the underlying primitives of our labor market search-monetary economy.
We include a labor market search-ﬂexible price model because the sticky price models we
study yield poor results. The labor market search-ﬂexible price model produces synthetic NKPC
moments .i/ ￿ .iii/ that match their sample counterparts. Thus, our results suggest that the real
rigidity of labor market imperfections is likely responsible for observed price level ﬂuctuations.
The next section presents the NKPC-PV relation, its BNSW-VE decomposition, and reports
empirical results. Section 3 reviews the Yun-sticky price model. Model calibration, labor market
search, and Monte Carlo results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2Other monetary models ﬁt different aspects of U.S. price dynamics. Ireland (1999) and Ruge-Murcia (2003) esti-
mate game-theoretic monetary policy models that capture long-run inﬂation. Nason and Cogley (1994) show a ﬂexible
price-DSGE monetary model replicates short-run price dynamics under a long-run monetary neutrality identiﬁcation.
32. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
NKPCestimates are controversially. Sbordone (2002), Galiand Gertler (1999), andRabanal
and Rubio-Ram´ ırez (2003) report empirical success with the NKPC. Fuhrer and Moore (1995),
Fuhrer (1997), Roberts (1995, 1997, and 2001), and Rudd and Whelan (2001), among others, test
backward-lookingPhillips curves against the forward-looking NKPC and reject it. We come at this
debate differently because we identify the trend and cyclical components of the NKPC.
2.1 A NKPC Speciﬁcation
Roberts (1995) shows that several sticky-price models yield the NKPC. Typical is the Calvo
(1983) staggered price setting mechanism. Sticky prices arise because only a fraction, 1 ￿ ￿,o f
monopolistically competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms are able to set and commit to a new price, PC;t,
between dates t ￿ 1 and t. Aggregate price, Pt, dynamics are restricted by








1=.1￿￿/; 1 <￿ ; (1)
where ￿, m￿, and ￿ ￿ are the demand elasticity, steady state money growth, and non-stochastic
growth rate of labor augmenting technology change, respectively. Assume the aggregator of ﬁnal
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where ﬁrm j charges Pj;t for its output and all ﬁrms take YD;t and Pt as given. Subsequent to cost
























































; 0 <ˇ<1; (3)
where Etf￿g, ˇi€tCi, and ￿t represent the mathematical expectations operator conditional on date
t information, the date t C i (stochastic) discount rate all ﬁrms face, and real marginal cost.
Sticky price dynamics force monopolisticallycompetitiveﬁrms to be forward-lookingwhen
price setting. This gives the NKPC its forward-lookingcharacter, which is developed by linearizing
the price aggregator .1/ and the optimal price rule .3/, subsequent to detrending, to construct













where constants are ignored. The equilibrium law of motion .4/ shows the price level is driven by
the trend of the “annuity value” of the expected future path of nominal marginal cost.
The price dynamics of .4/ shows that the price level and nominal marginal cost share a
common trend or cointegration relation, lnŒ￿t￿ D $CI.lnŒPt￿ lnŒˆt￿/0, where $CI D Œ1 ￿ 1￿,i f
nominal marginal cost is I.1/. Subtract lnŒˆt￿ from both sides of equation .4/, apply the usual PV













Real marginalcost is endogenous and forward-lookingbecause it equals (a multiple of) inﬂationnet
of the expected PV of nominal marginal cost growth. Note also that real marginal cost is stationary
and acts as the cointegration relation or error correction mechanism in a vector error correction
5model (VECM) of inﬂation and nominal marginal cost growth. Given Engle and Issler (1995) refer
to cointegration relations as cycle generators, real marginal cost approximates the NKPC cycle.
Another NKPC prediction is that inﬂationand nominal marginalcost growthshare a serially
correlated common feature, in the sense of Engle and Kozicki (1993). The NKPC common feature
exists if inﬂation and nominal marginal cost growth form a linear combination whose residual is
unpredictable. The NKPC-PV relation .4/ produces the linear combination
￿lnŒPt￿ ￿ ￿B￿lnŒˆt￿ D ￿
￿1Et￿lnŒPtC1￿ ￿ &ˆ;t;￿ B ￿
.1 ￿ ￿/.B ￿ ￿/
￿2 ; (5)
where &ˆ;t = ￿B fEt￿1 ￿lnŒˆt￿ C.Et ￿ Et￿1/ lnŒˆt￿ C
P1
jD1 .￿=B/
j .Et ￿lnŒˆtCj￿ ￿ .￿=B/
.Et ￿ Et￿1/lnŒˆtCj￿1￿/g. The regression .5/ yields the NKPC common feature relation if &ˆ;t
annihilates serial correlation in expected inﬂation to generate (unpredictable)innovations.
2.2 NKPC Common Trend Prediction: Estimates and Tests
The proxy for nominal marginal cost is nominal unit labor costs, ULCt, which is measured
as the ratio of hourly compensation to output per hour.3 The price level, Pt, is the GDP deﬂator.
The sample period is 1960Q1￿2001Q4, T D 168, with lags available beginning with 1955Q1.
We test for a common trend in Pt and ULCt using Johansen (1988, 1991) likelihood ratio
(LR) tests based on a third-order VECM, case 1￿ model of Osterwald-Lenum(1992).4 The LR-max
and LR-trace statistics are [8.23, 12.98] and [8.23, 21.20], respectively. The former test rejects a
3Sbordone(2002) and Gali and Gertler (1999) show marginal cost equals ULC using the labor demand elasticity of
a Cobb-Douglastechnology of a monopolistic competitiveﬁrm. The Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis’ FRED databank
labels the index of hourly compensation (output per hour), non-farm business sector compnfb (ophnfb).
4A LR test for the lag length – beginning with 12 lags – of the VAR of the logs of the price level and ULC cannot
reject a four lag model. The AIC gives the same result.
6common trend in the price level and ULC and the latter does not based on MacKinnon, Haug, and
Michelis (1999) ﬁve percent critical values of [9.17, 15.88] for the LR-max test and [9.17, 20.25]
for the LR-trace test. The maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of $CT￿MLE is Œ1 ￿1:08 6:82￿.5
We report two additional cointegration tests because Johansen’s are inconclusive and can be
unreliable. The Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration test yields a t￿ratio of -3.34, which rejects
its null at the ﬁve percent level, according to MacKinnon (1991). Boswijk (1994) constructs a Wald
test from a simultaneous equations VECM, based on a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator.
The Wald statistic of 11.82 falls between the ten and ﬁve percent critical values Boswijk tabulates
(his table B.3). These tests lend support to a model in which lnŒPt￿ and lnŒULCt￿ cointegrate.
2.3 NKPC Common Feature Prediction: Estimates and Tests
Two tests for a serially correlated common feature employ the canonical correlations, ￿,
of inﬂation and ULC growth, conditional on the VECM(3) information set. Inﬂation and ULC
growth share a serially correlated common feature if the smallest ￿ D 0. Vahid and Engle (1993)
develop a ￿2-common feature test, but a F￿test exists due to Rao (1973) that has superior small
sample properties, according to Engle and Issler (1995). The ￿2s equal 0.0513 and 0.8243, with
associated p-values of 0.19 (0.21) and 0.00 (0.00) for the ￿2 .F￿/test.
Vahid and Engle show a 2SLS regression provides a common feature test and recovers
$CF D Œ1 ￿ ￿B￿.6 The 2SLS estimate of ￿B equals 0.8203, with a standard error of 0.0800,
5The Johansen (1991) test of the theoretical $CI against $CT￿MLE is not rejected at standard signiﬁcance levels.
6Gali and Gertler (1999) use generalized method of moments to estimate the NKPC, which imputes inﬂationary
expectations to the instrument vector. Sbordone (2002) minimizes the distance between price level dynamics restricted
by a NKPC and the actual price level. This is akin to the instrumental variables estimator of West (1989).
7given the VECM(3) regressors are instruments. The LM test of instrument validitycannot reject the
null, given a p-value of 0.16 for the statistic 9.32.
We have to calibrate B to calculate ￿2SLS, NKPC sample moment .i/, from ￿B;2SLS.W e
set ˇ = 1.03￿0:25, ￿ D 0:0047, and m￿ D expf0:0167g, where m￿ and ￿ are taken from U.S. data;
see section 4.1 for details. The calibration implies the NKPC sample moment .i/, ￿2SLS, is 0.5292
with a standard error of 0.0081.7 Thus, ﬁrms change prices twice a year, on average.
Another test compares a VECM(3) restricted by the common feature against an unrestricted
VECM(3). This LR test has ten degrees of freedom and a p-value of 0.55. Along with tests of
the squared canonical correlations and 2SLS instrument validity, the LR test provides evidence that
favors the NKPC serially correlated common feature of .5/.
2.4 The BNSW-VE Decomposition of the NKPC
The BNSW-VE decomposition relies on levels data and $CI and $CF, according to Vahid












to recover the NKPC cycle from ￿￿;2 ￿ $CI.lnŒPt￿ lnŒULCt￿/0. The trend follows.
Figure 1 contain theNKPC trend andcycle, or NKPC sample moment .ii/. The topwindow
of ﬁgure 1 shows that the NKPC trend supports traditional views of recent U.S. aggregate price
history. The tight labor markets of the mid-1960s coincide with an increase in the NKPC trend.8
7Vahid and Engle describe a MLE that stacks the common featureregression ontop of the ECM(3) of ULC growth.
The MLE of ￿B equals 0.8927, with a standard error of 0.1080. The gives ￿ D 0.5192 and a standard error of 0.0153.
8The price level is less volatile than the NKPC trend because the covariance equals -0.13.
8The trend falls with the recession that begins in late 1969. The 1970s sees a rising trend at the time
of the ﬁrst oil price shock. The contractionary monetary policy initiated late in 1979 pushes the
NKPC trend below the price level from 1980 until the economic expansion of the mid-1990s. The
NKPC trend dips below the price level just before the NBER peak dated 2001Q1.
The NKPC cycle and NBER dated business cycle peaks (vertical dash lines) and troughs
(vertical dot-dashlines) appear in the bottom window of ﬁgure 1. It shows NKPC cycle peaks at the
lastsevenNBERdatedrecessions. Sincethecycleisanegative(uptoascalar)ofreal unitlaborcost,
when it rises it signals recovery from recession. Thus, the NKPC cycle is economically important,
consistent with prior views of the Phillips curve, but at odds with the NKPC-PV predictions.
The NKPC sample moment .iii/ employs the BNSW-VE decomposition to gauge the con-
tribution of the identiﬁed trend shock to movements in the GDP deﬂator.9 The FEVDs with respect
to the trend are 2.70, 8.80, 26.38, 60.12, 78.37, 86.55, 91.44, and 98.05 percent at 1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 16,
20, and 40 quarter forecast horizons, respectively.10 Note that trend innovations are responsible for
about a quarter of price level ﬂuctuations at a one-year forecast horizon and 60 percent at the end
of two years. It takes ﬁve years to reach 90 percent.11 This is evidence against the NKPC because
cyclical shocks matter for the price level, at least, through a two-year forecast horizon.
9It is not possible to identify the trend (cyclical) shock as a supply (demand) shock.
10Engle and Issler (1995) and Issler and Vahid (2001) outline methods to calculate FEVDs, under the BNSW-VE
decomposition. Trend innovation are a function of the common trend growth rate, lagged appropriately. Innovations
to the cyclical component are the residuals of the cyclical component regressed on the information set of the VECM,
lagged j times. Trend and cyclical innovationsare orthogonalizedby ‘regressing’ the latter on theformer, which asserts
trend innovations are prior to cyclical innovations; see footnote 11 and appendix C of Issler and Vahid for details.
11The trend shock takeslonger to dominate ULC ﬂuctuations,because its FEVDs are 0.28, 2.01, 10.79, 41.34, 65.00,
77.52, 85.41, and 96.65 percent. However, the NKPC places no restrictions on these FEVDs
9To summarize, we study three NKPC moments: .i/ the 2SLS estimateof thesticky price pa-
rameter, ￿2SLS, .ii/ the NKPC common trend-common cycle decomposition, and .iii/ its FEVD.
Our evidence lends only weak support to the NKPC because cyclical shocks matter for price level
moments. This raises the question of the role of nominal rigidities for price level ﬂuctuations. The
next two sections study this question using DSGE monetary models.
3. A Sticky Price DSGE Model
This section reviews the sticky-price DSGE model of Yun (1996). This model combines
cash and credit goods, a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint, and a Calvo-staggered price mechanism
into a one-sector growth model.12 Section 4 integrates a real rigidity into Yun’s DSGE model with
the labor market-search structure that Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), and den Haan, Ramey, and
Watson (2000) use in a RBC setting. We also study a ﬂexible price version of this DSGE model.
3.1 The Final Goods Sector
Monopolisticallycompetitiveﬁnalgoodsﬁrmstakeaddressesontheunitinterval. Producing
a differentiated good employs a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology, F.k ￿ K;hZ/ ￿
.k ￿ K/￿.hZ/1￿￿;￿2 .0; 1/, where k is capital, K is an exogenous minimum capital threshold
(e.g., infra-structure) common to all ﬁnal goods ﬁrms, and hZis productivityaugmented hours.13
Monopolistic competition in the ﬁnal goods market forces the associated prices to depend
12A slew of sticky price speciﬁcations are used in monetary business cycle models. Examples are King and Wolman
(1996), Nelson (1998), Ireland (2001a), Kozicki and Tinsley (2001), Sbordone (2001), and Smets and Wouters (2002).
13Monopolistically competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms must face period-by-period ﬁxed costs. Below, we outline a labor
market search structure that precludes ﬁxed labor costs as in Yun (1996) because hours are not priced in a spot market.
10on nominal marginal cost, ˆ. The jth ﬁnalgood ﬁrm sets its price byminimizing its total cost, TC j
D RK kj + Wh j, subject to the CRS technology, where RK is the nominal rental rate of capital.
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions (FONCs) are RK D ˆ￿yj=kj and W D ˆ.1￿￿/yj=hj. Place
these optimality conditions into the cost function and exploit the CRS technology to show, TC j D
















given demand schedule .2/.
We study economies in which ﬁnal goods prices are sticky and ﬂexible. When ﬁnal goods
prices are ﬂexible, real marginal cost is constant, ￿ D .￿ ￿ 1/=￿, and prices are a constant markup
over marginal costs. A ﬁnal good ﬁrm whose behavior is restricted by the Calvo staggered price
























The FONC of PC;t leads to the forward-lookingprice-setting optimality condition .3/.
Construction of aggregate dividend and production functions closes the ﬁnal goods sector.







j;t dj.14 The deﬁnition of aggregate output, YA;t ￿
R 1
0 yA;j;tdj, and the
demand schedule .2/ gives YD;t D .Pt=PA;t/
￿￿ YA;t.15 These facts lead to the aggregate real divi-
dendfunction, Dt=Pt D.Pt=PA;t/￿￿ Œ1￿￿￿t￿YA;t ￿ .RK;t=Pt/Kt ￿ .Wt=Pt/ht. Sincetechnology
14The associated dynamics are P
￿￿
A;t D .1 ￿ ￿/P
￿￿
C;t C ￿.m￿ expf￿￿gPA;t￿1/￿￿.
15This eliminates PC;t from the state of the economy leaving only current and lagged aggregate prices.
11is CRS, marketclearing relativeprices, RK;t=Pt and Wt=Pt, and thedeﬁnitionsof aggregatecapital
and hours result in YA;t D .Kt ￿ Kt/￿ .htZt/1￿￿, which is the aggregate production function.
3.2 The Household
Households decisions cover consumption, leisure, capital accumulation, and ﬁnancial port-
folios (to hold cash and government bonds). Felicity is summarized by




1 ￿  2
; (7)
where 0 <  1 < 1;  2 ¤ 1; 0 ￿  3, cM;t; cL;t, and `t .D 1 ￿ ht/ are cash consumption, credit
consumption, and leisure, respectively. The household faces the budget constraint
Dt C RK;t kt C Wt ht C .1 C RB;t/BG;t C Mt ￿ AtC1 (8)
D PtŒcM;t C cL;t C ktC1 ￿ .1 ￿ ıK/kt C Tt￿;
the CIA constraint
Mt ￿ Pt cM;t; (9)
and the wealth constraint
At ￿ BG;t C Mt ￿ Xt￿1; (10)
where 0 <ı K < 1, and Dt, BG;t, Mt, At, Tt, andXt￿1 denotedividendsthe householdreceives
from ﬁnal good ﬁrms, government bonds this household owns at the beginning of date t, cash the
household carries over to date t from the end of date t ￿ 1, nominal wealth it takes from the end of
date t ￿ 1 into the beginning of date t, a lump-sum tax levied on all households, and the total cash
injection, respectively. The government pays RB;t on its one-period unit discount bond.
123.3 The Government
The government engages in monetary and ﬁscal operations. The latter activities involve
expenditures, Gt, lump-sum tax collecting, Tt, and issuing one-period unit discount bonds, BG;tC1.
The monetary operation injects Xt units of cash into the household sector. Hence, the intertemporal
budget constraint of the government is
PtTt C .BG;tC1 ￿ BG;t/ C .MtC1 ￿ Mt/ D PtGt C RB;tBG;t C Xt: (11)
We let Tt D Gt at each date t and assume the government spending-output ratio, gt D Gt=YD;t,
evolves exogenously. Government bonds are restricted to be in zero net supply, BG;tC1 = 0, along
the equilibrium path. Cash injections obey Xt D MtC1 ￿ Mt and monetary base growth, mt .D
MtC1=Mt/, is assumed to be an exogenous stochastic process to avoid entangling the predictions
of our DSGE models with an arbitrary monetary policy rule.
3.4 Household Optimality
The household maximizes its expected lifetime utility subject to .8/￿ .10/. Lifetime utility












;ˇ 2 .0; 1/:






1 C .1 ￿  1/RB;t
￿
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Firms and the government take the sequence of SDFs, f€tCjg1
jD0, as given, when they discount





.1 ￿  1/
€tPt
; (13)
which is the household “consumption function”.
Optimal choice of employment hours by the typical household involves the usual trade-off
between leisure and the rewards of labor market activity. The optimality condition of ht is
 3




The household supplies labor up to the point at which the dis-felicityof work equals the discounted
real wage according to .14/. This wage is determined in a perfectly competitive spot market.
The dynamic program the household solves produces two intertemporal optimality condi-
tions. The Euler equation, €t=Pt D ˇEtf.€tC1=PtC1/Œ1 C RB;tC1￿g, describes optimal intertem-
poral choice in the money market. It shows the interaction of the CIA constraint and next period’s
liquidity preference trade-off between consumption and the government’s unit discount bond. The







C .1 ￿ ıK/
￿￿
; (15)
which is determined by the FONC of KtC1 and the envelope condition for Kt. Euler equation .15/
shows the household is willing to postpone a unit of date t consumption for the return additional
capital is expected to yield during date t C 1 for date t C 2 consumption.
143.5 Aggregate Equilibrium and Optimality
Equilibrium requires the goods, capital, money, government bond, and labor markets to





Yt D Ct C KtC1 C .1 ￿ ıK/Kt C Gt: (16)
The aggregate resource constraint .16/ adds together the budget and wealth constraints, .8/ and
.10/, of the household, the government’s budget constraint .11/, and the ﬁrm’s dividend ﬂow .6/.
Since the rental market for capital, the money market, the government bond market, and the labor
market are perfectly competitive, agents treat the joint stochastic process that generates returns and
the nominal wage, fRK;tCj; RB;tCj; WtCjg1
jD0, as given. The same holds for the exogenous shock
process fZtCj; KtCj; GtCj; XtCjg1
jD0.
Any candidate equilibrium of the Yun-sticky price must satisfy the optimality conditions
and the aggregate resource constraint for Ct, ht, Pt, ￿t, and KtC1. The optimality condition for
consumption is the aggregate resource constraint .16/. Optimal labor market activity ties the labor
supply schedule embedded in .14/ with a ﬁrm’s FONC with respect to hours
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Optimal price behavior requires the consumption function .13/, the SDF .12/, and cM;t D Mt=Pt,
which is the CIA constraint .9/ in equilibrium and deﬁnes money market equilibrium. A ﬂexible
price regime equates aggregate consumption to real balances plus (the present-value of) the pur-
chasing power of a dollar. The law of motion of the price level .1/ and the optimal commitment
price condition .3/ restricts the optimal path of ￿t in a sticky-price economy. This forces money







1￿￿ C .1 ￿ ıK/
io
; (18)
which rests on the Euler equation .15/ and the nominal rental rate of capital. The transversality
conditions of the endogenous state variables are sufﬁcient conditions of any candidate equilibrium,





4. Comparing Sample and Theoretical NKPCs
This section reports on the calibration, solution strategies, and Monte Carlo experiments.
Next, labor market search is placed in the sticky-price model to compare and contrast the implica-
tions for the NKPC of this real rigidity with the nominal rigidity of sticky-prices. We complete this
study of the NKPC with a ﬂexible price version of our monetary DSGE with labor market search.
4.1 The Calibration and Numerical Solution
We generate an approximate numerical solution of the Yun-sticky price model from the lin-
earized stochastically detrended variants of its optimality conditions, laws of motion, and equilib-
rium conditions. Stochastic detrending is necessary because labor augmenting technology evolves






growth is a AR(1), mtC1 D m￿.1￿￿m/ m
￿m






lnŒmt￿ D lnŒMtC1=Mt￿ and Ef"tCi￿m;tCjgD0, 8i;j.16 Real aggregates and prices are detrended
as b U Y;t D UY;t=Zt and b UP;t D UP;tZt=Mt, respectively, where UY;t D ŒYD;t YA;t Ct KtC1 Gt￿
and UP;t D ŒPt PA;t PC;t￿. Detrending c W t D Wt=Mt, b €t D €tZt, and b RK;t D RK;t=Pt, follows.
16We assume the transitory components of KtC1 and gtC1 are non-stochastic.
16The numerical solution is obtained by linearizing the detrended aggregate resource con-
straint .16/, the hours schedule .17/, the SDF .12/, the consumption function .13/, the law of
motion of the price level that underlies the NKPC-PV relation .4/, and the Euler equation of KtC1,
.18/. The solution we conjecture is
KtC1 D ￿KKt C ￿EEt; (19)
where KtC1 D Œ e KtC1 @tC1 =tC1￿0, e KtC1 D lnŒ b KtC1=K￿￿, @tC1 D Et e P tC1, =tC1 D Pt, and the
exogenous state vector, Et D Œ"t ￿m;t￿0. We seek the unknown elements ofthe three-by-threematrix
￿K and the three-by-two matrix ￿E using methods Zadrozny (1998) and Sims (2000) develop to
compute approximate numerical solutions.17 Given solutions for ￿K and ￿E, the control system is
Ct D ￿KKt C ￿EEt; (20)
where Ct D Œe C t e ht e P t e ￿t￿0, ￿K is a four-by-three matrix, and ￿E is a four-by-two matrix. The
approximate linearized solution drives e KtC1 and Ct, which includes e P t, with two lags of price
expectations. This imposes the NKPC-PV restrictions on the Yun-sticky price model solution.
We employ sample data and choices made by other studies to calibrate model parameters.
Preference parameters ˇ and  1 are 0.9950 and 0.8428, respectively. The latter implies an interest
elasticity of money demand of one percent, given the federal funds rate sample mean. We take the
other preferences parameters from Andolfatto (1996),  2 D 2:0 and  3 D 2:08. The technology
parameter ￿ D 0:35 and ıK D 0:0195. The steady state markup is 1.10, which yields ￿ D 11:0.
The sticky price parameter is calibrated to the NKPC sample moment .i/, ￿2SLS D 0:5292.
17Manystickypricemodelshave a singularleadingcoefﬁcientmatrix inthestochasticdifferenceequationsystemthat
arises from linearizing optimality and equilibrium conditions. Sims (2000) describes a solution and provides software.
17The calibration of the impulse structure relies on sample data from 1960Q1￿2001Q4. The
deterministic growth rate ￿ D 0:0047 is the sample mean of measured total factor productivity
growth and its sample standard deviation is ￿" D 0:0117.
The parameters of the AR(1) process of money growth are based on the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis’ monetary base series. Its mean growth rate is 0.0166. Estimation of the AR(1)
regression of money growth yield ￿m D 0:4456 and ￿￿;m D 0:0068.18
4.2 Monte Carlo Design
We generate 5000 replications of the monetary DSGE models. A replication is 168 obser-
vations of the price level and ULC.19 At each replication, the MLE-cointegrating vector, $CI,
of the case 1￿ VECM(3) is estimated. Conditional on a lag of the cointegration relation and three
lags of artiﬁcial inﬂationand ULC growth,the 2SLS regression of inﬂationona constantand ULC
growthiscomputed to produce thecommonfeature vector, $CF, andasyntheticestimate of ￿2SLS.
Synthetic estimates of the $CI and $CF vectors are employed to construct the BNSW-VE decom-
position and its FEVD. We report theoretical FEVDs in table 1. Figure 2 contains nonparametric
densities of the ensemble of synthetic estimates of ￿2SLS and the asymptotic 95 percent conﬁdence
interval of the sample ￿2SLS. Theoretical NKPC trends and cycles appear in ﬁgures 3, 4, and 5.
18As previously mentioned, the transitory components of the ﬁxed capital component and government spending are
assumed to be nonstochastic. We set g￿ at its sample mean, 0.1878. Calibration of K
￿
is problematic. It cannot be
constructed without observations on ﬁxed capital. The closest notion is structures, but U.S. capital stock data reveals
the ratio of structures to total capital is about 0.23 for the 1960 ￿ 2000 sample. We assume K
￿
D 0:025. Experiments
with values between 0.25 and 25 percent have little impact on the Monte Carlo experiments.
19We compute 372 artiﬁcial observations, but drop the ﬁrst 204 to remove dependence on initial conditions.
184.3 Yun-Sticky Price Model Experiments
Simulations of the Yun (1996) model reveal it to be at odds with NKPC sample moments
.i/￿.iii/. The mean of theoretical ￿2SLS estimates is 0.8264, which places its density (thedashed
curve) to the right of the asymptotic 95 percent conﬁdence interval (vertical dotted lines) of the
sample ￿2SLS.D 0:5293/ in ﬁgure 2. Although the Yun-sticky price model is calibrated to NKPC
sample moment .i/, this model predicts more stickiness in the price level.
Figure 3 has the evidence the Yun (1996) sticky price DSGE model fails to replicate NKPC
sample moment .ii/. The topwindow of ﬁgure 3 shows that the theoretical NKPC trend fallson top
of the sample GDP deﬂator. Thus, the theoretical NKPC cycle exhibits excess smoothness, which
explains the theoretical one-standard deviation conﬁdence bands of ﬁgure 3.
Table 1 contains the sample and theoretical FEVDs of the price level with respect to trend
shocks andtheoretical one-standarddeviationconﬁdenceintervalsof thelatter FEVDs(in brackets).
The FEVDs of the Yun-sticky-price model and its one-standard deviation conﬁdence intervals are
all greater than 97.8 percent, which indicate little uncertainty about these FEVDs. The price level
FEVDs of this sticky price model matches the NKPC-PV prediction, but is far away from NKPC
sample moment .iii/ because actual U.S. price movements are not only driven by trend shocks.
4.4 Labor Market Search-Sticky Price Models Experiments
Thefailureof theYun-sticky price modelindicatesthenominalrigidityofsticky prices alone
cannot explain the NKPC sample moments .i/￿.iii/. Gali and Gertler (1999), among others, sug-
gest a real rigidity may resolve this problem. We add the real rigidity of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) job-search that Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995), and den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000)
19successfully place in RBC models. An appeal of labor market search is the restrictions it places on
the Phillips curve, as discussed, for example, by Solow (1976).
Labor market search ties real and nominal activity together with the matching and search
technologies available to ﬁrms and households. Firms and households engage in job search because
hours are bought and sold in the presence of labor market externalities related to the costs of posting
vacancies and looking for work. Firms post vj;t plant-job vacancies at a cost of ￿ per vacancy.20
The not-employed devote St hours to job search which generates felicity and pecuniary costs.
We assume a ﬁnal good ﬁrm operates multiple plants and identify an active plant with a
job.21 Firms with empty-plant jobs and the not-employedare brought together randomly, according
to the den Haan, Ramey, and Watson(2000) CRS matching technology
M.Vt;. 1 ￿ Nt/St/ D
VtŒ.1 ￿ Nt/St￿
.V #
t C Œ.1 ￿ Nt/St￿#/1=#; 0 <# ; (21)
where Vt.￿
R 1
0 vj;tdj/ is total plant-job vacancies and Nt denotes aggregate employment (or the
measureofactiveplant-jobs). However,theprobabilityofasuccessfulmatchisinﬂuencedindirectly
by variation either in posted vacancies or in not-employed search effort. This reﬂects the labor
market externalities associated with search; see the appendix for details.
Job search alters aggregate household felicity .7/. When a not-employed household gives
up leisure to search a fraction St of its one unit of date t time endowment, this household suffers a
felicityloss equalto  5 .1￿St/1￿ 4 =.1￿ 4/, where 4 ¤ 1 and 0 ￿  5. Sincecomplete income
20Total recruitment costs represent a drain on aggregate output. This forces us to assume that ￿ shares the technology
trend, but has a non-stochastic transitory component.
21Andolfatto (1996) points out that a CRS production technology in the presence of job search equates a plant-job
with an operating plant. Hence, the aggregate measure of plant-jobs and the measure of the employed are equivalent.
20and wealth insurance creates an aggregate household that is a weighted average of employed and
not-employed households, the leisure component of aggregate household felicity becomes Nt 3
.1 ￿ ht/1￿ 2=.1 ￿  2/ + .1 ￿ Nt/  5 .1 ￿ St/1￿ 4.1 ￿  4/; see the appendix for details.
The wealth constraint of the employed and not-employed differ because the not-employed
face transactions costs to job search. We assume these costs rise with search effort at rate '. >
0/ and that the only resource available to pay these costs is the cash injection the not-employed
receive from the government. For the not-employed, this adds ￿'St￿Xt￿1 to the wealth constraint
.10/. Thus, the employed and not-employed respond differently to the cash injection. Combine the
employed and not-employedwealth constraints to obtain the aggregate wealth constraint
At ￿ BG;t C Mt ￿ Œ1 ￿ '.1 ￿ Nt￿1/St￿1￿Xt￿1; (22)
where the weights are Nt￿1 and 1 ￿ Nt￿1. Within the aggregate household, complete wealth insur-
ance requires the employedto transfer cash to the not-employed to hold the latter harmless for their
search costs. The appendix discusses these issues.
Firm andnot-employedsearchfrictions placedemandsonaggregateoutput. Givencomplete





Yt D Ct C KtC1 C .1 ￿ ıK/Kt C Gt C .1 ￿ Nt/'
Xt
Pt
St C ￿tVt; (23)
from the wealth constraint of the aggregate household and the aggregate dividend process.22 The
last two terms on the right of the aggregate resource constraint .23/ reﬂect the real resource loss
22The appendix outlines the insurance schemes that give rise to the felicity function of the aggregate household and
the rest of the economy-wide optimality and equilibrium conditions. Aggregation rests on the capital stocks, dividends
received, cash held, and bonds owned by these households to be equal date-by-date. This assumes that employed and
not-employedhouseholds hold equal endowments of capital and ﬁnancial wealth at date zero. Further, we assume away
21that arises from job search by households and ﬁrms, respectively.
Job search precludes a spot market for labor. Rather than a Walrasian auctioneer, a ﬁrm
and the aggregate household negotiate a labor contract over hours and the real wage to split match
surplus at each date the employment relationship exists. Match surplus is the sum of the capitalized
value of an active plant-job and the net beneﬁts the aggregate household receives from the ongoing
job match. Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), and Cooley and Quadrini (1999) assume the aggregate
household receives a ﬁxed fraction, ￿, of the surplus at each date t. Thus, the aggregate household’s
contribution to match surplus equals ￿ times the capitalized value of an active plant-job.
The surplus splitting rule together with optimal ﬁrm and aggregate household behavior pro-





















C .1 ￿ ￿/HX;t; (24)
whereHX;t = 3 .1￿ 2/￿1 .1￿ht/1￿ 2 ￿  5 .1￿ 4/￿1 .1￿St/1￿ 4 ￿ '€tXtSt=Pt and K
￿
isthe
steadystate of Kt.23 Alongtheequilibriumpath, discountedreallabor incomeis aweightedaverage
of that match’s value-added to aggregate output and the alternative activities (e.g., non-employment
and search) available to the aggregate household. The marginal product of labor plus the foregone
costs of ﬁxed capital and ﬁrm job search represent the former. The latter is the net impact on felicity
of an ongoing plant-job match and foregone transactions job-search costs. Note that the real wage
is a function of real marginal cost, ￿t, in a sticky price regime. Unlike a spot market in which the
any wealth disparities caused by ownership claims on ﬁnal goods ﬁrms. If employed and not-employed households are
initially given equal equity in ﬁnal goods ﬁrms, the dividend ﬂows will be equalized. Also, these results depend on the
additive separability of felicity. Sims (1998) discusses related issues.
23The appendix constructs the equilibrium real wage process .24/.
22real wage equals the intersection of labor supply and labor demand (productivity)schedules at each
date t, labor market search creates persistence and volatility in the real wage that differs from labor
productivity. This creates a monetary transmission mechanism in a labor market search model.
Calibration of the labor market search models follows the process described in section 4.1.
The not-employed preference parameters  4 and  5 equal two and 1.37, respectively. The exoge-
nous ﬁxed separationrate is set at0.0848, whichplaces ıN withinthe range Merz (1995), den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2000), and Andolfatto (1996) use. The calibration of  4,  5, and ıN help
guarantees aggregate hours and employment match their sample counterparts. Cooley and Quadrini
(1999) ﬁx 1=# D 1 ￿ ￿ at 0.6. This matters for the NKPC because the ﬁrst task of a Phillips curve
is to describe price behavior. We do the same.24 The vacancy cost parameter ￿ D 0:1050 is taken
from Andolfatto.25 We assume job-search transactions costs impose a 0.1 percent loss on velocity
at the steady state (in terms of sample GDP and the monetary base). This yields ' D 0:3060.
We solve models with labor market search using methods described in section 4.1. The
linearized aggregate household and ﬁrm job-search optimality conditions, the aggregate resource
constraint .23/, and the law of motion of aggregate employment, NtC1 D .1 ￿ ıN/Nt C Mt, add
e N tC1 to the state vector KtC1 and e St to the control vector Ct. The transversality condition for




D 0, where ƒt is the shadow price of a job match.
The theoretical density of ￿2SLS generated by the labor market search-sticky price model
(dot-dash curve) appears in ﬁgure 2. This density is to the right of NKPC sample moment .i/
24Since 1￿￿ D 1=#, the power the aggregate household exerts on contract negotiations equals the household’sshare
of the match surplus. Thus, the equilibrium real wage is the same as the socially optimal wage; see Hosios (1990).
25The steady state is also constructed to make the probabilities that a vacant plant-job is ﬁlled and that someone
not-employed ﬁnds work consistent with the den Haan, Ramey, and Watson calibration.
23because only 58 of the 5000 estimates reside within the 95 percent asymptotic conﬁdence interval
of the sample estimate of ￿2SLS. The mean of synthetic estimates of ￿2SLS equals 0.6607, which
also signals the labor market search-sticky price model cannot explain NKPC sample moment .i/.
Figure 4 presents NKPC moment .ii/, the common trend and common cycle, of the labor
market search-sticky price model. The theoretical NKPCtrend (thetop window)closely followsthe
actual GDP deﬂator. This explains the smoothness of the one-standard deviation conﬁdence bands
of the theoretical NKPC cycle (the bottom window).
TheFEVDsof theprice levelwithrespectto thetrend shockandtheirone-standarddeviation
coverage intervals generated by the labor market search-sticky price model appear in the fourth
column of table 1. Since the one-standard deviation coverage interval of the FEVD runs from 35
to 96.5 percent at the one-quarter forecast horizon, it suggests a short-run role for cyclical shocks.
However, thetheoreticalone-quarterhorizonFEVD of69 percentandtheoneyear-horizonofnearly
90 percent are closer to the NKPC prediction than to the relevant sample FEVDs. Thus, the labor
market search-sticky price model ﬁnds it difﬁcult to reproduce NKPC sample moment .iii/.
In summary, NKPC sample moments .i/ ￿ .iii/ fail to be replicated by the Yun- and labor
marketsearch-stickyprice models. Acommonelementacrossthetwomodelsisthatthestatevector,
KtC1, of their linearized solutions contain price expectations, as in the state system .19/ and .20/ of
theYun-sticky pricemodel. SincethisisthewaytheNKPC-PVrestrictionsareimposedin thesticky
price models, it explains the upward bias in synthetic estimates of the sticky price parameter, the
excess smoothness in the NKPC trend and cycle, and the dominate trend response of the theoretical
FEVDs. This suggests the theoretical link between the price level and price expectations needs to
be broken for monetary DSGE models to ﬁt NKPC sample moments .i/ ￿ .iii/.
244.5 Flexible Price-Labor Search Model Experiments
This section reports on a DSGE model that replaces the sticky price mechanism .1/ with a
ﬂexible price regime. This eliminates the price expectation term, Et e P tC1, and the stochastically































and their lags from the control system that contains the equilibrium price level process





















of the labor market search-ﬂexible price model.
Figure 2 shows that the 95 percent asymptotic conﬁdence interval of ￿2SLS falls within the
density of theoretical ￿2SLS estimates produced by the labor market search-ﬂexible price model
(the solid line). More than 46 percent of these estimates are contained in the 95 percent asymptotic
conﬁdence interval, Œ0:5133; 0:5450￿. The theoretical mean of ￿2SLS is 0.5300, compared to a
sample mean of 0.5293. Thus, an econometrician who studies the labor market search-ﬂexible price
model would recover the NKPC sample moment .i/.
NKPC FEVDs of the labor market search-ﬂexible price model appear in the last column of
table1. Theoretical FEVDsare largerthansample FEVDs at1, 2, 4, and 8 quarterforecasthorizons,
but smaller beyond a two-year horizon. However, one-standard deviation conﬁdence intervals of
the theoretical FEVDs cover the sample FEVDs, except at one- and two-quarter horizons. Thus, the
labor market search-ﬂexible price model matches much of NKPC sample moment .iii/ driven only
by a random walk technology shock and a money growth process whose AR1 coefﬁcient is 0.45.
25The theoreticalNKPCtrendandcycle ofthelabor marketsearch-ﬂexibleprice model appear
in ﬁgure 5. A weakness of the labor market search-ﬂexible price model is that the theoretical
NKPC trend (the top window) and cycle (the bottom window) are more volatile than their sample
counterparts. The relative volatility of the NKPC cycle (trend) is 1.5098 (1.3622). This model is
able to replicate the persistence of the sample NKPC cycle. The AR1 coefﬁcients from the sample
and the theoretical ensemble of the NKPC cycles are 0.9335 and 0.9476, respectively.
Figure 5 also shows that differences between the empirical and theoretical NKPC trends are
greatest around peaks and troughs. The one-standard deviation conﬁdence bands cover the sample
NKPCcycle, beginningwiththemid-1970s. Weconcludethatthelabormarketsearch-ﬂexibleprice
model has more success matching NKPC sample moment .ii/, than do the sticky price models.
4.6 Price Level Fluctuations, Labor Market Search, and the NKPC
Labor market search has difﬁculties with several important business cycle facts. Cole and
Rogerson (1999)pointout labor market search modelssuffer from several weaknesses, among them
incorrect predictions about job creation, job destruction, and unemployment ﬂows.26 Likewise,
Walsh (2002) and Trigari (2003a) report that labor market search-monetary DSGE model produce
too much nominal volatility, which we conﬁrm with the labor market search-ﬂexible price model.27
Nevertheless, the labor market search-ﬂexible price model is better able to replicate the NKPC
sample moments .i/ ￿ .iii/, than do the sticky price models we study.
Our results are linked to previous Phillips curve research. For example, the labor market
26Trigari (2003b) argues that a combination of nominal rigidities and labor market search solves these problems.
27Ireland (2001b) ﬁnds a ﬂexible price model in which an interest rate rule deﬁnes monetary policy matches inﬂation
volatility in pre-1979 U.S. data. Sticky prices must replace ﬂexible prices to ﬁt inﬂation volatility in post-1979 data.
26search-ﬂexible price experiments explain the importance attached to sticky wage mechanisms, for
example, by Jeanne (1998), Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), and Rabanal and Rubio-Ram´ ırez
(2003) because the labor market search-ﬂexible price model relies on “stickiness” in the labor mar-
ket. Our results are also related to King andWatson (1997). They show U.S. data supportsa Phillips
curve that allows for ﬂexible prices, but in which labor market variables are sticky. According to
King and Watson, their evidence ﬁts the sort of Phillips curve Solow (1976) describes. It is also
consistent with the state system .25/￿.26/of the labor market search-ﬂexible price model because
the equilibrium decision rule for NtC1 responds to shocks dated t, not t C 1, and the current price
level is ﬂexible with respect to date t shocks.
The real wage equation .24/ imposes restrictions on the NKCP trend and cycle of the labor
market search-sticky price and -ﬂexible price models. The labor market search models tie the wage
contracting process to real unit labor cost, Wtht=PtYA;t, because it equals the right hand side of
equation .24/, subsequent to dividing by €tYA;t. The balanced growth conditions of the models we
study impose a theoretical cointegration relation on Wtht=PtYA;t. The theoretical NKPC common




























ignoring constants. Engle and Issler (1995) note that the common feature vector $CF applied to
levels data generates the NKPC trend because serial correlation in the NKPC cycle is annihilated.
Across the DSGE models we study, the theoretical price level is driven in the long-run only by
permanent movements in the level of technology, lnŒZt￿, and the money stock, lnŒMt￿.
27Theoretical price level ﬂuctuations depend also on changes in the endogenous state vector
of the economy. Under a sticky price regime, short- to long-run theoretical price level movements
in the Yun and labor market search models are “excessively” smooth because the endogenous state
vector, Kt includes price expectations, whose dynamics are restricted by the NKPC-PV relation
.4/. Within linearized solutions of the sticky price models, the response of e P t to Et￿1 e P t and e P t￿1
reﬂect these restrictions, as in the control system .20/ of the Yun sticky price model.
A ﬂexible price regime does not drive e P t with price expectations, but instead by capital,
employment, andshockimpulseas in thestate system .25/￿.26/of thelabor marketsearch-ﬂexible
price model. Although the NKPC-PV restrictions no longer govern e P t in the ﬂexible price model,
the price level exhibits “stickiness” because of the impact of labor market search on employment
dynamics. This stickiness is enough for the labor market search-ﬂexible price model to mimic
NKPC sample moments .i/￿.iii/. Thus, the real rigidity of labor market search is a prime friction
for an economically useful monetary transmission mechanism independent of nominal rigidities.
5. Conclusion
ThispaperdevelopsanewKeynesianPhillipscurve(NKPC)present-valuerelation,in which
nominal unitlabor cost is the fundamental,rather than real unit labor cost. The NKPCpresent-value
relation restricts the price level to respond only to trend shocks at all forecast horizons. We also
show that the NKPC present-value relation has a common cycle-common trend decomposition that
is based on Beveridge and Nelson (1981), Stock and Watson (1988), and Vahid and Engle (1993).
The NKPC trend-cycle decomposition is used to do the ﬁrst job of a Phillips curve: to provide a
good description of price level dynamics.
28The last 40 years of U.S. GDP deﬂator and nominal unit labor cost data offers weak support
of the NKPC. We estimate about half of U.S. ﬁnal goods ﬁrms are price constrained, which is
close to estimates reported elsewhere. The NKPC cycle is economically important because it peaks
during the last seven NBER dated recessions. Forecast error variance decompositions reveal that
trend shocks only begin to account for more than 60 percent of price level movements at forecast
horizons of two years or more. Thus, the NKPC prediction that trend shocks dominate price level
ﬂuctuations at all forecast horizons is not supported by the data.
We study the implications of the NKPC present-value prediction for the theoretical price
level of several dynamic stochastic general equilibrium monetary models. Simulation experiments
show that the Yun (1996) model with Calvo (1983) staggered price setting reproduce the NKPC
present-value predictions. Hence, a model with only the nominal rigidity of sticky prices generates
excess smoothness in the NKPC trend-cycle decomposition.
Earlier Phillips curve models invokelabor market imperfectionsto explain price level move-
ments. We pursue this idea by adding labor market search to the Yun-sticky price model. Monte
Carlo experiments of the labor market search-sticky price model yield NKPC moments that are not
qualitativelydifferentfrom the model with onlysticky prices. Unlikethe labor marketsearch-sticky
price model, its ﬂexible price cousin is better able to match price level ﬂuctuations.
This paper takes up the Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten (2000) challenge to new Keynesian
notions that nominal rigidities generate short-run monetary non-neutralities. We broaden the Chari,
Kehoe, and McGratten research agenda by studying the monetary transmission mechanism that
arises from the real rigidity of labor market search. We identify the real rigidity with labor market
search because its externality suggests a role for monetary policy. Since labor market search is only
29one speciﬁcation within a large class of real rigidity-DSGE ﬂexible price models, it points to the
need to search for an economically meaningful monetary transmission mechanism within this class
of models that can be used for policy analysis. We leave this task for future research.
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33Table 1. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
One Standard Deviation Conﬁdence Intervals
FEVDs of Price w/r/t Trend, Generated by DSGE Models
Sample Yun-Sticky Search-Sticky Search-Flexible
Horizon PGDP Price Model Price Model Price Model
1 2.70 98.90 69.22 24.94
[97.81 99.93] [34.77 96.53] [6.92 48.03]
2 8.80 99.33 80.87 37.90
[98.67 99.96] [61.21 98.72] [13.09 69.48]
4 26.38 99.65 89.32 52.90
[99.31 99.98] [84.05 99.60] [23.01 85.63]
8 60.13 99.85 94.32 67.48
[99.70 99.99] [94.80 99.88] [38.70 94.08]
12 78.37 99.91 96.17 74.80
[99.82 100.00] [97.40 99.95] [49.05 96.68]
16 86.55 99.94 97.15 79.18
[99.88 100.00] [98.48 99.97] [56.35 97.77]
20 91.44 99.96 97.75 82.12
[99.92 100.00] [99.01 99.98] [61.93 98.42]
40 98.05 99.99 98.97 89.21
[99.97 100.00] [99.76 99.99] [76.92 99.51]
The values in brackets are the 16th and 84th percentiles of the FEVDs generated from 5000 repli-
cations of the DSGE models.
34Appendix
This appendix contains details of the timing of the DSGE models, the labor market search structure,
and the income and wealth insurance scheme we develop to construct the aggregate household of
the labor market search DSGE models of our paper.
A1. Events and Decisions in Monetary DSGE Models
with Labor Market Search
The timing of the economy follows. Households enter date t with the physical and ﬁnancial
assets accumulatedat the endof date t￿1. Date t begins withthe exogenous shocks of the economy
being realized. Successfully matched ﬁrms and households strike labor contracts over real wages
and hours. Firms with active plant-job rent capital from households at this moment to combine
with contracted hours and the exogenous level of technology to generate output to sell into the ﬁnal
goods market. When the law of motion .1/ guides aggregate price dynamics, those ﬁrms able to
alter their output price do so just prior to production because supply adjusts to meet demand in
Keynesian model. Next, the money and bonds market open given households have made decisions
aboutaccumulatingcapital, ﬁnancialwealth, andcash to carry intodate tC1. Atthismoment, ﬁrms
with latent plant-jobs and not-employedhouseholds search for one another. Along withexisting job
matches (that do not separate), the ﬂow of new job matches are carried forward as date t C 1
aggregate employment.
A2. Elements of a Monetary DSGE Model
with Labor Market Search
Section A2:1 developstheoptimal search decisions aﬁrm employsto ﬁll itsjob-plantvacan-
cies. We construct the complete insurance that is the underpinning of the representative household
in section A2:2. Section A2:3 presents the optimality conditions of the aggregate household with
respect to labor market search. Aggregate optimality and equilibrium conditions appear in section
A2:4
A.1A2.1 The Firm and Labor Market Search
Firms either produce with a plant-job, are engaged in search to ﬁll an empty plant-job, or
leave it latent. If the ﬁnal good ﬁrm ﬁlls a vacancy, the beneﬁt to this ﬁrm equals the capitalized
value of the active plant-job at date t C 1; JtC1, with probability !V;t. An unsuccessful search
forces the ﬁnal good ﬁrm to consider the future capitalized value of the latent plant-job, QtC1,
given the probability it is not ﬁlled, 1 ￿ !V;t. Hence, the capitalized value of a latent job-plant
evolves according to Qt D￿ €t ZV;t C ˇEt f!V;tJtC1 C .1 ￿ !V;t/QtC1g, where ZV;t denotes
date t job-recruitment costs.A.1 Free entry into the ﬁnal good sector requires Qt D 0 because ﬁrms
have an incentive to activate a vacancy when Qt > 0, or to close a plant down when Qt < 0. Thus,
along an equilibrium path the optimality condition
!V;tEtJtC1 D €t ZV;t; (A2.1.1)
equates the expected capitalized value of a future active plant-job to the discounted cost of ﬁlling
the vacancy.
Labor market search forces ﬁrms to recognize that an active plant-job represents an ongoing
employment relationship. Since job matches last more than one date, ﬁrms treat active plant-jobs
as capitalized assets. This implies the law of motion of aggregate plant-jobs faced by ﬁnals goods
ﬁrms is NtC1 D .1 ￿ ıN/Nt C !V;tVt, where the exogenous non-stochastic job separation rate is
ıN 2 .0; 1/ and, on average, !V;tVt vacancies are ﬁlled at date t.
An active plant-job’s capitalized value can also be measured with its expected discounted
proﬁt ﬂow, Jt D Et f
P1
iD0 .1 ￿ ıN/i Qi
jD0 €tCj DtCig, where discounting involves .1 ￿ ıN/
because active matches separate at the non-stochastic rate ıN. This yields the law of motion
Jt D €tDt C .1 ￿ ıN/Et f€tJtC1g; (A2.1.2)
where the aggregate real dividend process is Dt=Pt D .PA;t=Pt/￿ Œ1￿￿￿t￿ YA;t ￿ .RK;t=Pt/Kt ￿
.Wt=Pt/Ntht ￿ ZV;tVt; in the symmetric equilibrium.
A2.2 Risk Sharing in the Household Sector
The employed and not-employed comprise the household sector. These households make
decisions about capital accumulation, ﬁnancial portfolios (to hold cash and government bonds),
labor supply (employment, hours, and wages), and job search (effort). The penultimate decisions
are associated with the employed while the latter activity pertains to the not-employed.
A.1We assume that the transitory component of ZV;t is non-stochastic.
A.2A2.2.1 Risk Sharing in the Household Sector
An employedhouseholdenjoys the beneﬁts andsuffers thecosts of an active job match. The
non-pecuninary beneﬁts and costs are summarized by this household’s felicity function




1 ￿  2
;
where 0 <  1 < 1;  2 ¤ 1; 0 ￿  3, cE;M;t; cE;L;t, and `E;t .D 1 ￿ ht/ are cash con-
sumption, credit consumption, and leisure of the employed household, respectively. The employed
household faces the budget constraint
DE;t C RK;t kE;t C Wt ht C .1 C RB;t/BE;G;t C ME;t ￿ AE;tC1
D PtŒcE;M;t C cE;L;t C kE;tC1 ￿ .1 ￿ ıK/kE;t C ￿N;tTN;t C Tt￿;
the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint ME;t ￿ Pt cE;M;t, and the wealth constraint
AE;t ￿ BE;G;t C ME;t ￿ ￿X;t￿1TX;t￿1 ￿ Xt￿1; (A2.2.1)
where ıK 2 .0;1/, and DE;t, BE;G;t, ME;t, AE;tC1, ￿N;t, Tt, ￿X;t￿1, and Xt￿1 are the dividends
theemployedhouseholdreceives from ﬁnalgoodsﬁrms, thegovernment bondsthis householdowns
at the beginning of date t, the cash the employed household carries over from the end of date t ￿ 1,
the nominal wealth the employed household takes from the end of date t into the beginning of date
t C1, the taxlevied onemployedhouseholds to pay for income insurance, TN;t, a lump-sum tax, the
tax levied on the cash injection received by employed households to pay for the wealth insurance,
TX;t, that not-employed households receive, and the total cash injection, respectively. Cash earns a
zero nominal return. The government pays RB;t on its one-period unit discount bond.
Anemployedhouseholdenjoysan ongoingrelationshipwithaplant-jobof a ﬁnalgoodﬁrm.
The ongoing nature of this relationshipoccurs because the job match continues from date t into date
tC1 withprobability 1￿ıN. Givena not-employedhousehold exerts effortsto moveinto employed
status, the probability a job match occurs is !S;t. In this case, the law of motion of the measure of
employed households becomes
NtC1 D .1 ￿ ıN/Nt C !S;t.1 ￿ Nt/St; (A2.2.2)
where !S;t.1 ￿ Nt/St equals the measure of successful job searches by the not-employed.
A.3Besides the obvious difference, an employed household differs from a not-employed house-
hold because the latter puts effort into ﬁnding a match and employment. This implies the felicity
function of the typical not-employedhousehold is




1 ￿  4
;
where  4 ¤ 1, 0 ￿  4, cS;M;t; cS;L;t, and `S;t .D 1 ￿ St/ are cash consumption, credit consump-
tion, and leisure of the not-employed household, respectively.
In all respects save one, the budget constraint of the not-employed household is the same as
the budget constraint of the employed household. The disparity between the budget constraints is
the not-employedhousehold receives a government income transfer that replaces wage income. As
a result, the budget constraint of the not-employedhousehold is
DS;t C RK;t kS;t C .1 C RB;t/BS;G;t C MS;t ￿ AS;tC1
D PtŒcS;M;t C cS;L;t C kS;tC1 ￿ .1 ￿ ıK/kS;t C .1 ￿ ￿N;t/TN;t C Tt￿;
where the subscript S denotes the not-employed household. However, the CIA constraint of the
not-employed household maintains the form MS;t ￿ Pt cS;M;t.
The wealth constraint of the not-employedhouseholddiffers from that of a employedhouse-
hold. The not-employed faces transactions costs when it searches. We assume these transactions
costs rise with search effort in a linear fashion at rate '. >0/. Hence, the not-employed household
requires cash to engage in job search. Since thenot-employedhousehold faces a CIAconstraint, the
cash injection from the government represents the only available cash to pay the transactions search
cost. In this case, the wealth constraint becomes
AS;t ￿ BS;G;t C MS;t C .1 ￿ ￿X;t￿1TX;t￿1/ ￿ .1 ￿ 'St￿1/Xt￿1; (A2.2.3)
where the not-employedhousehold receives a nominal wealth transfer of 1￿￿X;t￿1TX;t￿1. The next
section discusses the set of government policies necessary for this transfer and the income trans-
fer to make the distribution of capital and ﬁnancial wealth independent of household employment
histories.
A.4A.2.2.2 The Government
The government engages in monetary, ﬁscal, (real) income and (nominal) wealth insurance
operations. Besides its expenditure, Gt, and tax collecting, Tt, activities, the government injects a
total of Xt units of cash into the household sector, and conducts open market operations (OMOs)
by issuing one-period unit discount bonds, BG;tC1. Governmental social insurance policy provides
actuarially fair income and wealthinsurance to households. This implieshousehold resource alloca-
tions arise without consideration of past employment by any household. The intertemporal budget
constraint
PtTt C PtNt￿N;tTN;t C ￿X;tTX;t C .BG;tC1 ￿ BG;t/ C .MtC1 ￿ Mt/
D PtGt C Pt.1 ￿ Nt/.1 ￿ ￿N;t/TN;t C .1 ￿ ￿X;t/TX;t C RB;tBG;t C Xt;
records government accounts across this range of activities.
Complete insurance requires the government chooses ￿N;t and ￿X;t to equate the (shadow)
pricesofthebudgetconstraintandwealthconstraintacrossemployedandnot-employedhouseholds.
When complete income insurance prevails, the government sets ￿N;t D 1 ￿ Nt to yield PtTt D
Wtht. The income (insurance) tax rate households face equals the probability they will need this
insurance. Thus, employed and not-employed households enjoy the same level of consumption.A.2
Similarly, the government achieves complete wealth insurance when ￿X;t D 1 ￿ Nt so that
TX;t D￿ 'StXt.A.3 For the wealth of the not-employed to be fully insured, government transfers
more of the cash injectionemployedhouseholdsreceive to not-employedhouseholds as their search
hours rise, taking the cash injection Xt￿1 parametrically.
The government’s intertemporal budget constraint becomes
PtTt C .BG;tC1 ￿ BG;t/ C .MtC1 ￿ Mt/ D PtGt C RB;tBG;t C Xt; (A2.2.4)
in the presence of complete income and wealth insurance. Equation .A2.2.4/ is the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint, equation (11), of the paper.
A.2This results rests on the felicity of the employed and not-employedbeing separable in consumption and leisure and
log in consumption. Andolfatto (1996) lays out further assumptions and restrictions necessary and sufﬁcient for this
type result. In particular, the aggregate household is assumed to be engaged in randomly handing out job matches to its
members period-by-period. This separates the worker ﬂows from the ﬂow of ongoing matches at plant-job level. Also,
the value function of the aggregate household has to be concave in its arguments.
A.3This follows from complete wealth insurance imposing equality on the shadow prices of wealth of employed and
not-employed households which requires ￿X;tTX;t C Xt D .1 ￿ 'St/Xt ￿ .1 ￿ ￿X;t/TX;t.
A.5A.2.2.3 The Aggregate Household
The outcome of thegovernment employmentinsurance program yields the aggregate house-
hold. Aggregation of a typical employed and not-employedhousehold produces the value function,
Vt, and its Bellman’s equation
Vt D MaxfcM;t;cL;t;ht;ht;Mt;BG;t;KtC1;NtC1g
￿
 1lnŒcM;t￿ C .1 ￿  1/lnŒcL;t￿
C Nt 3
.1 ￿ ht/1￿ 2
1 ￿  2
C .1 ￿ Nt/ 5
.1 ￿ St/1￿ 4
1 ￿  4
￿
C ˇEt fVtC1g;
where Vt ￿ V.Kt; Nt; Mt; BG;t; Zt; mt/. The constraints the aggregate household faces are
Dt C RK;t Kt C Wt ht C .1 C RB;t/BG;t C Mt ￿ AtC1 (A2.2.5)
D PtŒcM;t C cL;t C KtC1 ￿ .1 ￿ ıK/Kt C Tt￿;
and the CIA constraint
Mt ￿ Pt cM;t: (A2.2.6)
which follow from the government provision of full income and wealth insurance.A.4 Given com-
plete wealth insurance, aggregation of the wealth constraints .A2.2.1/ and .A2.2.3/ produces
At ￿ BG;t C Mt ￿ Œ1 ￿ .1 ￿ Nt￿1/'St￿1￿Xt￿1: (A2.2.7)
Along with .A2.2.5/, .A2.2.6/, and .A2.2.7/, the aggregate household faces the law of motion of
the measure of employed households, .A2.2.2/, given the laws of motion of the exogenous shocks.
A.4In an equilibrium with complete income and wealth insurance, it becomes apparent that KtC1 D kE;tC1 D
kS;tC1; DtC1 D DE;tC1 D DS;tC1; MtC1 D ME;tC1 D MS;tC1, and BG;tC1 D BE;G;tC1 D BS;G;tC1.
This assumes that employed and not-employed households hold equal endowments of capital and ﬁnancial wealth
at date zero. Further, we assume away any wealth disparities that are caused by ownership claims on ﬁnal goods
ﬁrms. However, if employed and not-employed households are initially given equal equity stakes in ﬁnal goods ﬁrms,
the dividend ﬂows will be equalized. Also, these results depend on the additively separable character of the felicity
functions, as already noted.
A.6A2.3 The Household and Labor Market Search
The impact of labor market search on aggregate household felicity, the aggregate wealth
constraint, andthelawof motion ofaggregateemploymentleads to theoptimal job-searchcondition
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where ƒt is the shadow price of an active job-match. The optimality condition .A2.3.1/ equates
the dis-felicity of job-search plus the associated transaction-search costs to the probability, !S;t,o f
a successful job match, valued at the shadow price of the marginal match, ƒt.








The Euler equation .A2.3.2/ sets the value of an additional job match equal to the discounted ex-










St C Œ.1 ￿ ıN/ ￿ !S;t St￿ƒt; (A2.3.3)
whereHt ￿  3.1￿ 2/￿1.1￿ht/1￿ 2￿ 5.1￿ 4/￿1.1￿St/1￿ 4. Theenvelopecondition .A2.3.3/
is the sum of the beneﬁts the aggregate household receives from an ongoing job match, the change
in felicity from moving a household from not-employed to employed status, the discounted real
labor income, the foregone transactions-search costs, and the discounted value of the job match.
The latter discounting accounts for the ﬁxed rate of job separation net of the probability that job
search is successful given search effort is St.
A2.4 Aggregate Optimality and Equilibrium
Remember that ﬁrms with plant jobs not in operation and the not-employed meet randomly
and that we borrow the den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) CRS matching technology
M.Vt;. 1 ￿ Nt/St/ D
VtŒ.1 ￿ Nt/St￿
.V #
t C Œ.1 ￿ Nt/St￿#/1=#; 0 <# ; (A2.4.1)
A.7to place the not-employed in available job vacancies, where Vt ￿
R 1
0 vj;tdj is total plant-job va-
cancies. Note that the probability of a successful match is inﬂuenced indirectly either with variation
in posted vacancies or by changes in not-employed search effort. Denote the probability a vacant
plant-job is ﬁlled !V;t .D M .Vt;. 1 ￿ Nt/St/=Vt/ and that someone not-employed ﬁnds work
!S;t .D M.Vt;. 1￿Nt/St/ =Œ.1￿Nt/St￿/. The CRS search technology .A2.4.1/ bounds !V;t and
!S;t between zero and one. Given these probabilities, the aggregate law of motion of employment
is
NtC1 D .1 ￿ ıN/Nt C Mt: (A2.4.2)
The stochastic ﬂow of new job matches and non-stochastic rate of job destruction is a weakness of
this class of labor market search model.
The optimality condition .A2.1.1/ determines if a ﬁnal good ﬁrm operates a plant-job. The
surplus rule implies that the left-side of .A2.1.1/ equals Œ.1 ￿ ￿/=￿￿Et@VtC1=@NtC1. Equate this
expression with the Euler equation .A2.3.2/ to ﬁnd
￿€ t ZV;t D .1 ￿ ￿/!V;t ƒt: (A2.4.3)
This optimality condition states that the discounted cost of posting job vacancies by ﬁrms equals
the expected value of the job match to the household.
The optimality conditionthatcompletes the labor marketsubstitutes for @VtC1=@NtC1 in the
Euler equation .A2.3.2/ with the envelope condition .A2.3.3/ and the optimality condition .14/ of
ht using the equilibrium real wage generating process. This yields the Euler equation of the value





















￿ ￿HX;tC1 C Œ.1 ￿ ıN/ ￿ !S;tC1 StC1￿ƒtC1
￿
;
The current value of a plant-job match is forward-looking. It equals the expected discounted value
of the date t C 1 equilibrium wage process .24/ plus the net probability the match continues into
date t C 1. The persistence of the endogenous state variable NtC1, its shadow price ƒtC1, and the
non-Walrasian equilibrium wage process .24/ propagate productivityand money growth shocks.
A.8As noted in the paper Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), and Cooley and Quadrini (1999)
assume the rule to split match surplus is St D Jt C @Vt=@Nt and that the aggregate household
receives a ﬁxed fraction, ￿,o fSt during each date t.A.5 Since @Vt=@Nt D ￿St and .1 ￿ ￿/ @Vt=@Nt
D￿ Jt, thesurplussplittingrule, theenvelopecondition .A2.3.3/, thelawofmotionof Jt,.A2.1.2/,
the aggregate dividend function .6/, the rental rate of capital, and the optimality condition .A2.1.1/





















C .1 ￿ ￿/HX;t; (A2.4.5)
where HX;t =  3 .1 ￿  2/￿1 .1 ￿ ht/1￿ 2 -  5 .1 ￿  4/￿1 .1 ￿ St/1￿ 4 ￿ '€tXtSt=Pt and K
￿
is the steady state of Kt. Equation .A2.4.5/ is the equilibrium real wage (24) of the paper.
A2.5 The Model Solution
Numerical solution of the labor market search models requires the linearization of the (de-
trended) optimality and equilibrium conditions: consumption function (13), the cost to ﬁrms of
posting vacancies .A2.4.3/, the search cost of the not-employed .A2.3.1/, employed labor supply
.14/ evaluated using the real wage generating process .A2.4.5/, the Euler equation of capital .18/,
and the law of motion of ƒtC1, .A2.4.4/, the law of motion of employment .A2.4.2/, and the ag-
gregate resource constraint .23/. This adds NtC1 to the state vector KtC1 and the shadow price of
employment ƒt to the control vector Ct. The solution algorithm of the labor market search-sticky
price model isthe same that isdescribed in section 4.2 for the Yun-stickyprice model. Notethat this
solution linearizes the law of motion that generates the NKPC-PV relation (4). Under the ﬂexible
price regime, price expectations drop out of the standard solution state vector KtC1 and theoreti-
cal real marginal cost, ￿t, is eliminated from the control vector Ct. This permits standard solution
methods to be engaged, as in Zadrozny (1998).
A.5In the negotiations between a ﬁnal good ﬁrm and the aggregate household, 1 ￿ ￿ reﬂects the power the aggregate
household exerts on equilibrium real wages and hours.
A.9